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An Employment Contract "Instinct with an
Obligation": Good Faith Costs and Contexts
Robert C. Bird*
Introduction
What claim do we employment scholars have upon such an
important decision as Wood v. Lucy, Lady-Duff Gordon?' More
than a mere echo of Lucy's jurisprudential influence, we em-
ployment writers can abscond with the phrase for our very own.
Eight years before the decision, little known intermediate ap-
pellate court judge Francis M. Scott penned the now-famous 'in-
stinct with an obligation' phrase. 2 The opinion was no mere
contractual prelude to Lucy, no simple dispute over bargained-
for exchange between commercial partners, but rather a case
involving the enforcement of an employment agreement. Judge
Scott characterized an employment agreement as having an "in-
stinct with an obligation" to not terminate an employee during
the agreement's six year duration, even though the agreement
did not explicitly impose the obligation. 3 Seven years later, Jus-
tice Cardozo cited Scott's opinion for the phrase and the rest is
jurisprudential history.4 For better or for worse, this patch of
jurisprudential terrain is at least partially ours, though we
shall permit our learned contractual cousins its occasional use.
But what shall we do with this fabled patch of legal real
estate? When then-Judge Cardozo wrote in 1917 that a con-
tract "may be instinct with an obligation, imperfectly ex-
pressed,"5 the famed jurist triggered a ninety-year long effort,
mostly in contract, to define and explain the duty. Given the
* Assistant Professor, Marketing and Law, School of Business, University of
Connecticut.
1. 118 N.E. 214, 214 (N.Y. 1917).
2. McCall Co. v. Wright, 117 N.Y.S. 775, 779 (App. Div. 1909), aftd, 91 N.E.
516 (N.Y. 1910). The court's exact words were "instinct with such an obligation,"
but there is no need to quibble. Id.
3. Id.





intertwining history of contract and employment, as well as the
role of Judge Scott's decision, it is not surprising to see the fa-
mous Lucy case influence employment law.6 Justice Cardozo's
good faith obligation has helped form one of the three pillars of
wrongful discharge, a concept which has helped neuter the
harshest effects of the employment at will doctrine. Today, a
web of obligations exist in the employment relationship beyond
what Justice Cardozo could have imagined possible almost a
century ago.
This article will briefly explore three challenges to the or-
derly development of the good faith doctrine in employment
law. First, the meaning of good faith remains far from certain.
Courts have intermingled good faith with other employment
doctrines thereby hindering its widespread acceptance. Second,
the good faith covenant in employment lacks mutuality. Usu-
ally bilateral in the contractual context, the covenant remains
an obligation that usually runs only from the employer to the
employee. The questions of whether the covenant should obli-
gate employers and what the consequences of such an obligation
could be remain unaddressed. Finally, and perhaps most inter-
estingly, there is a limited understanding of the costs of the
good faith duty. The emerging empirical work studying the ef-
fects of wrongful discharge law, of which the duty of good faith
is a part, reveals potential economic costs of this important doc-
trine articulated by Cardozo ninety years ago.
I. The Tradition of Good Faith First-Level Heading
Tempting though it might be to herald the Lucy case as in-
venting a purely new theory, the notion of good faith was alive
and well long before 1917. The ancient Greeks conceptualized
the notion of good faith as a universal social norm measured by
external references.7 Ancient Romans characterized good faith
6. See, e.g., Monique C. Lillard, Fifty Jurisdictions in Search of a Standard:
The Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in the Employment Context, 57 Mo.
L. REV. 1233, 1234 (1992) (briefly discussing Lucy). See generally Franklin G. Sny-
der, The Pernicious Effect of Employment Relationships on the Law of Contracts,
10 TEx. WESLEYAN L. REV. 33 (2003) (explaining the intertwining history of con-
tract law and employment law).
7. Robert C. Bird & Darren Charters, Good Faith and Wrongful Termination
in Canada and the United States: A Comparative and Relational Inquiry, 41 AM.
Bus. L.J. 205, 220 (2004).
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as the embodiment of express terms as well as terms naturally
implied from the agreement." Canon law characterized good
faith as an overarching principle requiring that a transaction be
legally and morally conscionable.9 As a more complex market
economy dominated Europe in the Eighteenth Century, the
scope of good faith narrowed to the protection of substantive
justice and fair exchange. 10
In the twentieth century, Lucy's "instinct with an obliga-
tion" conception of exchange contributed to the modern embodi-
ment of good faith. Justice Cardozo carried the phrase with him
to the United States Supreme Court and used it in a variety of
contexts. 1 Courts and commentators have used the phrase to
support arguments ranging from statutory interpretation to
proper scope of application of equitable principles.12
Yet, if citations can be used as a measure, the Lucy case did
not immediately capture the nationwide judicial imagination.
Of the thirty-five cases that cite Lucy during the first ten years
after its decision, only three are from courts outside of New
York.13 Citation from the first of the three out-of-state cases oc-
curs in April, 1924,14 implying that for almost seven years the
8. James A. Webster, Comment, A Pound of Flesh: The Oregon Supreme Court
Virtually Eliminates the Duty to Perform and Enforce Contracts in Good Faith, 75
OR. L. REV. 493, 498 (1996).
9. Larry A. DiMatteo, The History of Natural Law Theory: Transforming Em-
bedded Influences Into a Fuller Understanding of Modern Contract Law, 60 U.
PITT. L. REV. 839, 863-64 (1999). See also R. Wilson Freyermuth, Enforcement of
Acceleration Provisions and the Rhetoric of Good Faith, 1998 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1035,
1051-52.
10. Freyermuth, supra note 9, at 1051-52.
11. Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294, 319
(1933) (stating "instinct with the recognition of a duty"); Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S.
73, 87 (1932) (characterizing a state court decision as "the whole opinion is instinct
with the concession").
12. Robert A. Hillman, "Instinct with an Obligation" and the "Normative Am-
biguity of Rhetorical Power," 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 775, 775 (1995) (citing numerous
examples).
13. The author used Westlaw's citing reference system to determine the num-
ber of citations. The cite check was limited to any cases citing Lucy from the date
of the decision, December 4, 1917, through December 4, 1927.
14. See Meader v. Incorporated Town of Sibley, 198 N.W. 72, 74 (Iowa 1924).
The two other out-of-state cases during this period are Hendler Creamery Co. v.
Lillich, 136 A. 631, 635 (Md. 1927), and Sovereign Camp, W.O.W. v. Todd, 283
S.W. 659, 672 (Tex.Civ.App. 1926). Special Chief Justice Hildebrand, writing in
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Lucy case remained largely unrecognized outside its own juris-
dictional borders. Although one cannot be sure, it may not have
received its immediate jurisprudential dues simply because of
the relative slowness with which cases diffused in an age with-
out electronic databases. 15
Like most cases, the Lucy phenomenon is a distinctively
American one. The case receives few citations in foreign
cases.' 6 The Lucy case, however, does appear in an employment
dispute in Ryan v. Textile, Clothing and Footwear Union of Aus-
tralia, a 1996 decision by the Court of Appeal of the Supreme
Court of Victoria. 7 In Ryan the court discusses the "instinct"
language to help it determine whether a collective bargaining
agreement was supported by sufficient consideration and mutu-
ality.' 8 The remaining cases involve traditional contract
disagreements.
Discussion regarding the impact of the Lucy case continues
today. Most recently, Victor Goldberg critiques the Lucy case as
more doctrinally problematic than modem scholars have given
it discredit for.' 9 The agreement between Lady Duff-Gordon
and her advertising agent, Otis Wood, allowed Wood to have the
[Tihere are so many inconsistencies in this policy . . .with little attention
being paid to the contradictions between the old and new provisions, that
the policy, when spread upon the table, looks like a crazy quilt, and when
read aloud sounds like a jazz melody. We believe in the freedom of contracts,
but "the law has outgrown its primitive stage of formalism when the precise
word was the sovereign talisman[.]" Wood v. Duff-Gordon, 222 N.Y. 88, 118
N.E. 214. And where an insurance company prepares as indefinite a con-
tract as the one involved in this case-so vague that an astute lawyer could
not be certain as to its meaning-it should not be heard to complain if the
courts prevent it from perpetrating a fraud on its members.
Todd, 283 S.W. at 672.
15. See generally Alvin M. Podboy, The Shifting Sands of Legal Research:
Power to the People, 31 TEx. TECH L. REV. 1167 (2000) (describing development of
legal research through the twentieth century).
16. E.g., O'Brien v. O'Brien Estate, [19981 Sask. R. 190 (Can.) (cited as a "clas-
sic discussion[ ] of 'illusory obligation'"); Dawson v. Helicopter Exploration Co.,
[1955] S.C.R. 469 (Can.) (citing "instinct with an obligation" language). In the
United Kingdom, Lacy Duff-Gordon as an individual and not as a litigant is appar-
ently mentioned briefly in In re Ross, (1930) 1 Ch. 377, 378 (Can.).
17. (1996) 130 F.L.R. 313 (Austl.).
18. Id. at 325.
19. Victor P. Goldberg, Desperately Seeking Consideration: The Unfortunate
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exclusive right to place her endorsements on designs in ex-
change for half of the "profits and revenues" derived from the
contracts. 20 Goldberg remarks that Cardozo could have easily
ruled the other way noting that "because we are not to suppose
that Lucy would put herself at Wood's mercy, she had not in fact
done so. She would only be at his mercy if it were a legally bind-
ing contract."'21 Thus, Cardozo could have concluded that there
was no legally binding contract.22 Furthermore, Wood was em-
broiled in another "exclusive contract"-type dispute, and that
contract contained an explicit best efforts clause.23 The ques-
tion remains why a court should imply best efforts at all into
the contract between Wood and Lady Duff-Gordon. 24 The ongo-
ing debate about the propriety of the Lucy case and good faith
generally may have contributed to its uncertain application and
development, the focus of the next section of this article.
II. Good Faith in Employment
A. Nebulous Concept
In the United States, the precise scope and obligation of
good faith in employment remains unclear. One author found
at least eight different definitions of good faith amongst employ-
ment cases. 25 The list included such widely accepted definitions
such as "the benefit of the bargain," an act that is not in bad
faith, or honesty in fact.26 Other definitions included "[t]oo
vague to discuss," "I know it when I see it," and community
standards or business practice. 27 Good faith today remains one
of employment law's most nebulous concepts. 28
20. Wood v. Lucy, Lady-Duff Gordon 118 N.E. 214, 214 (N.Y. 1917).
21. Goldberg, supra note 19, at 108.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 109.
25. Lillard, supra note 6, at 1249-58. A Texas court, for example, listed five
interpretations of good faith. City of Midland v. O'Bryant, 18 S.W.3d 209, 213-14
(Tex. 2000).
26. Lillard, supra note 6, at 1249-58.
27. Id. at 1249, 1258.
28. Robert C. Bird, Rethinking Wrongful Discharge: A Continuum Approach,
73 U. CiN. L. REV. 517, 559 (2004). See also J. Wilson Parker, At-Will Employment
and the Common Law: A Modest Proposal to De-Marginalize Employment Law, 81
IOWA L. REV. 347, 359-60 (1995) ("The use of the implied covenant of good faith is




This uncertainty appears robustly in wrongful discharge
law. Wrongful discharge is a term that represents a collection
of doctrines that have limited the discretion of the employment
at will doctrine over the past thirty to forty years. 29 Wrongful
discharge law generally is comprised of three exceptions: 1) a
discharge in violation of a public policy such as refusing to per-
form an illegal act or exercising a legal right, 2) a discharge that
breaches an implied contract between the parties often estab-
lished by a company handbook, and 3) a discharge that
breaches an implied covenant that the employer will only termi-
nate in good faith and fair dealing.30 States have adopted these
various exceptions to employment at will since the 1970s. Some
states have adopted all three exceptions while others have in-
corporated none, one or two.31
The doctrine that has gained the least acceptance, and is
subject to the most confusion, is the good faith exception. The
good faith exception has been adopted by only eleven states,
much less than the public policy and implied contract excep-
tions, which both have been adopted by well over forty states.32
This may be because the good faith exception suffered from so
much initial uncertainty.
In 1974, the New Hampshire Supreme Court read one of
the earliest covenants of good faith and fair dealing into all em-
ployment arrangements. 33 The court's language defining the
covenant was so broad and ambiguous that it could have been
read to significantly weaken employment at will, no doubt caus-
ing great concern to employers. The court said:
[A] termination.., of employment at will which is motivated by
bad faith or malice or based on retaliation is not in the best inter-
is the] most nebulous judicial exception to the employment-at-will doctrine."); Lil-
lard, supra note 6, at 1260 ("[D]espite the combined efforts of [scholars and case
law] . . . a generalized understanding of good faith has not been forthcoming.").
29. Bird, supra note 28, at 519.
30. See generally David J. Walsh, On the Meaning and Pattern of Legal Cita-
tions: Evidence from State Wrongful Discharge Precedent Cases, 31 LAw & Soc'Y
REV. 337 (1997).
31. See generally David J. Walsh & Joshua L. Schwarz, State Common Law
Wrongful Discharge Doctrines: Up-Date, Refinement, and Rationales, 33 Am. Bus.
L.J. 645 (1996) (describing various adoption dates of three doctrines).
32. David H. Autor, John J. Donohue III & Stewart J. Schwab, The Costs of
Wrongful-Discharge Laws, 88 REV. ECON. STAT. 211 (2006).
33. See Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549 (N.H. 1974).
[Vol. 28:409414
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est of the economic system or the public good and constitutes a
breach of the employment contract. . . . Such a rule affords the
employee a certain stability of employment. 34
In 1980, Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc.35 adopted an im-
plied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in employment ar-
rangements. The decision allowed for both contract and tort
damages arising from its breach, and was generally considered
one of the broadest and most influential of good faith cases.36
Employers initially understood the decision to be their worst
human resources nightmare - prohibiting termination of any
employee without just cause.37
Subsequent opinions curtailed the scope of these rulings.
Howard v. Dorr Woolen Co. 3 8 limited Monge to a quasi-public
policy exception. The California Supreme Court significantly
curtailed the reach of Cleary's good faith ruling in 1988.39 The
jurisprudential damage, however, apparently had already been
done. From those initial cases onward, the good faith exception
in employment law never caught on like its implied contract
and public policy counterparts. Today, the good faith exception
is limited to "timing cases" where the employer improperly de-
nies specific benefits of an agreed-upon employment bargain
such as commission payments, 40 sick leave 4' and pension
benefits. 42
Further impairing the development of the good faith excep-
tion is its misapplication by interpreting courts. First, some
courts interpreting the good faith exception have intermingled
it with other wrongful discharge exceptions. In Smith v. Ameri-
34. Id. at 551-52. See also Scott A. Moss, When There's At-Will, There Are
Many Ways: Redressing the Increasing Incoherence of Employment at Will, 67 U.
Prrr. L. REV. 295, 299 n.5 (2005) (characterizing the broad language of Monge as
"possibly repealing employment at will").
35. Cleary v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980).
36. David H. Autor, William R. Kerr & Adriana D. Kugler, Does Employment
Protection Reduce Productivity?: Evidence from US States, 117 ECON. J. F189,
F191 (2007).
37. Id.
38. 414 A.2d 1273, 1274 (N.H. 1980).
39. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988).
40. Fortune v. Nat'l Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251 (Mass. 1977).
41. Metcalf v. Intermountain Gas Co., 778 P.2d 744 (Idaho 1989).





can Greetings Corp.43 the court stated that "every employment
relationship, even one terminable at will, contains 'an implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing .... This covenant pro-
hibits discharge for a reason which contravenes public pol-
icy." '44 The court in Magnan v. Anaconda Industries, Inc.45 also
intermingled the public policy and good faith exceptions. 46 One
Justice, writing in partial concurrence and dissent, called out
the majority opinion on just this point, explaining that the ma-
jority's imposition of a good faith covenant on employers "gives
the employee a covenant that is nothing more than an empty
vessel."47 Other state courts have also blended the two, creating
further doctrinal uncertainty as to the scope and meaning of
good faith. 48
Second, courts have inadvertently equated good faith with
just cause-a doctrine that would negate employment at will
altogether. As mentioned above, early employers interpreting
Cleary believed just that. A later California court acknowl-
edged that the notions of good cause, bad faith and tortuous dis-
charge "were rather badly admixed in Cleary."49 In Stark v.
Circle K Corp.,5° the court held that to avoid a breach of the
covenant of good faith, an employer must have a "fair and hon-
est" reason for dismissal, language that implies just cause em-
ployment. 51 Given that in the 1980s the good faith doctrine was
43. 804 S.W.2d 683 (Ark. 1991).
44. Id. at 684.
45. 479 A.2d 781 (Conn. 1984).
46. Id. at 788-91, 791 n.25.
47. Id. at 792.
48. E.g., Decker v. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Colo., Inc., 931 P.2d 436, 446
(Colo. 1997) ("In the absence of such declarations of [legislative or other govern-
mental] public policy, there is no appropriate basis upon which to ground a tort of
breach of an express covenant of good faith and fair dealing in employment con-
tracts."); Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Mem'l Hosp., 710 P.2d 1025, 1036 (Ariz. 1985)
("We simply do not raise a presumption or imply a covenant that would require an
employee to do that which public policy forbids or refrain from doing that which it
commands.").
49. Koehrer v. Superior Court, 226 Cal. Rptr. 820, 827 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986).
50. 751 P.2d 162 (Mont. 1988).
51. Id. at 167. See also Huber v. Standard Ins. Co., 841 F.2d 980, 985 (9th Cir.
1988). The interpretation given in this case was later rendered invalid by a later
state court. See Mundy v. Household Fin. Corp., 885 F.2d 542, 544 n.1 (9th Cir.
1989) ("Because we are bound by an interpretation of state law by the highest state
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still in its formative years, the tendency to equate good faith
with just cause may have been a reasonable one. The effect of
the uncertainty and conflicting signals remains today, however,
and a relatively-established principle that guides contract and
insurance cases does not apply to most employment
relationships.
B. The Question of Mutuality
Does Cardozo's "instinct with an obligation" travel in both
directions? The normative obligations of the employer under a
covenant of good faith and fair dealing have been widely dis-
cussed. 52 Much less discussion, however, has taken place to de-
fine to what extent employees have any good faith obligations
towards employers.
The first place to begin in any discussion of employee obli-
gation in the workplace is the law of employee loyalty. Authors
as early as Horace Wood, author of the famed treatise that her-
alded the rise of employment at will, have commented on em-
ployee responsibilities. 53 After summarizing the employer's
obligations, Wood wrote that an employee must serve his em-
ployer faithfully, obey all reasonable commands and perform
his duties honestly, with ordinary care and due regard for the
interests of the employer's business. 54 Today, these obligations
survive in a collection of requirements invoking employee
loyalty.55
Examples where this loyalty duty has been invoked include
when a departing employee poaches co-workers away from his
former firm, engages in employer disparagement, or misuses
52. E.g., Katherine M. Apps, Good Faith Performance in Employment Con-
tracts: A "Comparative Conversation" between the U.S. and England, 8 U. PA. J.
LAB. & EMP. L. 883 (2006); Bird & Charters, supra note 7; Susan Dana, The Cove-
nant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing: A Concentrated Effort to Clarify the Impreci-
sion of its Applicability in Employment Law, 5 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. Bus. L. 291
(2004); Lillard, supra note 6.
53. See generally HORACE GAY WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND
SERVANT (2d ed. 1886). There may have been limited support for Wood's assertions
regarding the employment at will at the time. See Jay M. Feinman, The Develop-
ment of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM J. LEGAL HIST. 118 (1976).
54. Id. at 165-66.
55. See Benjamin Aaron & Matthew Finkin, The Law of Employee Loyalty in




company assets.56 Most recently, employee loyalty issues have
arisen in the context of Internet blogging that is critical of the
employer.57 Faithfulness due by an employee is relative to the
degree of trust and responsibility given by his or her employer.58
At the highest levels of management, this duty imposes upon
employees the obligation of "utmost fidelity."59
A mutual and binding good faith "obligation" between em-
ployers and employees might invoke notions of fairness, justice
and the prohibition of advantage-taking against the other party
in the relationship. Most employees need no such explanation
of the obligation, however, as they already have a strong 'in-
stinct' for the protections that are supposedly owed to them.
Pauline Kim's research reveals that a large majority of workers
untrained in the law apparently (and wrongly) believe that the
law protects them from unfair discharge similar to a just cause
standard in civil service jobs and collective bargaining agree-
ments.60 According to most respondents, firing someone to re-
place them with a lower wage worker, personal dislike and a
mistaken belief of employee theft were all illegal reasons to dis-
charge. 61 Employees may discern the employee's obligation
through their own "fairness heuristic," in that what the em-
ployee perceives to be unfair must also be illegal. 62 This could
encompass a seemingly unlimited range of actions limited only
by the subjective perception of the individual worker.
If Cardozo's "instinct" comes with an "obligation," what
should that obligation be? It is far from certain that employees
expect that they will be bound by their own reciprocal obliga-
56. Bird, supra note 28, at 563 (citing cases).
57, See Konrad Lee, Anti-Employer Blogging: Employee Breach of the Duty of
Loyalty and the Procedure for Allowing Discovery of a Blogger's Identity before Ser-
vice of Process is Effected, 2006 DuKE L. & TECH. REV. 2.
58. E.g., United Teachers Ass'n Ins. Co. v. MacKeen & Bailey, Inc., 99 F.3d
645, 649 (5th Cir. 1990).
59. Scott W. Fielding, Free Competition or Corporate Theft: The Need for
Courts to Consider the Employment Relationship in Preliminary Steps Disputes, 52
VAND. L. REV. 201, 206 (1999).
60. Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining with Imperfect Information: A Study of
Worker Perceptions of Legal Protection in an Employment at Will World, 83 COR-
NELL L. REV. 105 (1997).
61. Id. at 133-34.
62. Cynthia L. Estlund, How Wrong are Employees About Their Rights, and
Why Does it Matter?, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 6, 22 (2002).
418 [Vol. 28:409
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tions to the employer. No doubt few employees would accept an
arrangement whereby they could only leave (translation: 'fire')
their employer for a good cause such as an economic downturn
or a manager's substandard performance. Employees would no
doubt characterize such impositions as forced servitude. Yet,
good faith's "instinct with an obligation" should carry with it
some mutual responsibilities. The extent of these responsibili-
ties, however, is far from certain in the employment context.
Just how far good faith can extend can be seen in the unu-
sual example of Hudson v. Moore Business Forms, Inc.63 In
Hudson, plaintiff Ida Hudson (Hudson) sued her employer
under various state and federal employment laws arising from
the alleged unequal pay practices and sexually discriminatory
actions of her employer, Moore Business Forms (Moore). 64
Moore responded with its own counterclaim, which included an
allegation that Hudson breached an implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing.65 Moore alleged that Hudson breached
this covenant by rejecting opportunities to remain with the
firm, accepting special payments from Moore tied to termina-
tion, and then responding with a lawsuit claiming that her ter-
mination was unlawful. 66 According to Moore, Hudson denied
the existence of a contract in which she allegedly agreed to be
terminated in exchange for severance benefits. 67 As a result of
Hudson's departure, Moore sought $4 million in damages from
Hudson. 68
Reasoning that only the party in the stronger position can
be held liable for a breach of the duty of good faith in the em-
ployment context, and noting the lack of evidence of any special
severance payments-for-termination agreement, the court
called Moore's claim, "wholly without merit."69 Even if some ar-
rangement existed between Moore and Hudson, recognizing a
good faith duty in this scenario would create a specter of liabil-
ity over any employee wishing to leave their job. The implica-
tions of this could be far reaching. Employers could reduce
63. 609 F. Supp. 467 (N.D. Ca. 1985).
64. Id. at 470.
65. Id. at 478.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 477.
68. Id. at 480.




employee pay and benefits, and then threaten a breach of good
faith action if an employee sought to look for better employment
elsewhere. The effect would be to drastically reduce employee
mobility, impeding a wide variety of economically useful actions
ranging from free competition among actual and potential em-
ployers 70 to the creation of individual start-up enterprises. 71
Thus, a Hudson-style good faith duty could impose significant
transaction costs on job-switching activities.
Given the likely suppressive effect of even the possibility of
litigation, 72 the mere viability of the employer good faith claim
as an argument might negatively impact employee behavior.
The district court may have recognized this when it painted
Moore's good faith counterclaim as an "unconscionable claim for
$4 million dollars punitive damages against an unemployed wo-
man over 50 years of age whose husband is living on retirement
... [and] an overzealous attempt on the part of defendants'
counsel to intimidate this and other plaintiffs from pursuing
wrongful discharge litigation."73 After a sua sponte order to
show cause, the court imposed Rule 11 sanctions upon Moore's
counsel totaling $14,692.50. 74
Moore appealed. 75 The court ruled that Rule 11 sanctions
were not improper, reasoning that Moore's counsel had admit-
ted that the figure was chosen to offset Hudson's $4 million
claim against Moore and various employees. 76 The court re-
marked that this "strongly suggests a retaliatory motive and
70. Phillip J. Closius & Henry M. Schaffer, Involuntary Nonservitude: The
Current Judicial Enforcement of Employee Covenants Not to Compete-A Proposal
for Reform, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 531, 532 (1984). See also Christina L. Wu, Noncom-
pete Agreements in California: Should California Courts Uphold Choice of Law
Provisions Specifying Another State's Law?, 51 UCLA L. REV. 593, 608 (2003)
("California's strong public policy toward employee mobility therefore contributed
to swift economic and technological development in the state.").
71. E.g., Charles Tait Graves, The Law of Negative Knowledge: A Critique, 15
TEx. INTELL. PRop. L.J. 387, 406-07 (2007).
72. Cf Michael J. Garrison, Limiting the Protection for Employees from Com-
pelled Noncompete Agreements under State Whistleblower Laws: A Critical Analy-
sis of Maw v. Advanced Clinical Communications, 20 LAB. LAW. 257, 286 (2005)
(noting threat of litigation arising from enforcement of non-compete would have
negative effects on employee mobility).
73. Hudson, 609 F.Supp. at 480.
74. Id. at 481.
75. Hudson v. Moore Bus. Forms, Inc., 836 F.2d 1156 (9th Cir. 1987).
76. Id. at 1163.
420 [Vol. 28:409
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'erases the factual underpinning from . . .' [the firm's] damage
claims."77 The court also stated that the assertion of the good
faith claim alone did not support the imposition of sanctions.
The court remarked that "[t]he rapid and recent evolution of the
law in this area highlights the precariousness of drawing a line
between plausible and sanctionable arguments."78
Although neither the trial nor the appellate court found
Moore's novel good faith claim compelling, it apparently was not
so implausible to cross the line into frivolousness. This leaves
the door open for future employers to attempt this argument
again. Mitigating this possibility has been the retraction of the
good faith doctrine in employment since its broadest interpreta-
tion in the 1980s, when the Hudson case was decided. This does
not mean, however, that any possibility of an employer good
faith claim has disappeared. An expansion of an employee's 'in-
stinct with an obligation' beyond that of traditional duty of loy-
alty doctrine remains a possibility.
C. The Costs of Good Faith
When courts have adopted the good faith exception, com-
mon reasons given include that employment is similar to other
special relationships that have a good faith duty (e.g. insurer-
insured), the duty is recognized under common law or in the
uniform commercial code, or it has already been recognized in
other states.7 9 Courts rejecting the good faith exception com-
monly did so because it could not be reconciled with employ-
ment at will, other states had rejected the adoption, or it was a
change best left to the legislature.80 Only rarely did a court fo-
cus on the costs of good faith on employers or employees when
considering its adoption.8 '
77. Id. at 1163 (quoting Greenberg v. Sala, 822 F.2d 882, 887 (9th Cir. 1987)).
78. Id. at 1160.
79. Walsh & Schwarz, supra note 31, at 661.
80. Id.
81. One notable exception is Whittaker v. Care-More, 621 S.W.2d 395 (Tenn.
1981), which remarked when considering whether to adopt a wrongful discharge
exception:
Tennessee has made enormous strides in recent years in its attraction of
new industry of high quality designed to increase the average per capita
income of its citizens and thus, better the quality of their lives. The impact




Does the covenant of good faith and fair dealing impose eco-
nomic costs? Although there has been an increasing number of
empirical papers dealing with the effect of employment laws,
8 2
we know little about the empirical impact of good faith in the
employment context. The earliest studies appear to be those
that focused on the costs of wrongful discharge jury cases and
verdicts, of which good faith claims are a subset. The results
showed plaintiff success rates ranging between 46 percent and
78 percent.8 3 Median verdicts ranged between $76,500 to
$400,938 and average verdicts ranged between $238,221 and
$2,506,132.84 One of the early studies specifically examining
the costs of breach of good faith claims found that plaintiffs re-
ceived an average award of $540,899.85 A California law firm
reported that there were 249 California employment verdicts in
1998.86 The firm classified the various employment claims
brought according to their success rate.8 7 Claims of a breach of
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing were found to be suc-
cessful only 35 percent of the time, compared with greater suc-
cess rates for "public policy tort (66%), disability discrimination
(56%), and sexual harassment (56%) to sex discrimination
(50%), breach of contract (50%), [and] age discrimination (37%)"
actions.88 Only race discrimination claims (13 percent) and na-
sidered before any substantial modification is made in the employee-at-will
rule.
Id. at 397.
82. See, e.g., Minna J. Kotkin, Outing Outcomes: An Empirical Study of Confi-
dential Employment Discrimination Settlements, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 111
(2007); Laura Beth Nielsen & Robert L. Nelson, Rights Realized? An Empirical
Analysis of Employment Discrimination Litigation as a Claiming System, 2005
Wis. L. REV. 663; Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment Dis-
crimination Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 429, 429
(2004).
83. David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Verdicts Matter: An Empirical Study of
California Employment Discrimination and Wrongful Discharge Jury Verdicts
Reveals Low Success Rates for Women and Minorities, 37 U.C. DAVis L. REV. 511,
518 (2003).
84. Id.
85. See David J. Jung & Richard Harkness, The Facts of Wrongful Discharge,
4 LAB. LAW. 257, 263 (1988).
86. Oppenheimer, supra note 83, at 521-22 (citing Litigation: Law Firm Pro-
vides Survey Data on Jury Verdicts in Employment Cases, DAILY LAB. REP., Dec.
12, 1999, at 1).
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tional origin claims (1 percent) were reported to be less
successful.8 9
These high victory percentages and award amounts, how-
ever, may be attributed to the fact that all of the studies men-
tioned examined California cases. California is generally
viewed as a pro-employee jurisdiction.90 During the time period
these studies were undertaken, the mid-to-late 1980s, Califor-
nia was still governed by the broad pronouncement in Cleary v.
American Airlines, Inc.,9l which held that lucrative tort reme-
dies, as well as contract remedies, were available under a
breach of good faith claim. Only in late December of 1988 did
the California court restrain Cleary's broad reach and limit
good faith plaintiffs to contract-based recoveries. 92 These stud-
ies and the scholarship analyzing them may have contributed to
an inflated perception of wrongful discharge law as a major
threat to employers. 93
Scholars have not studied the empirical impact of good
faith in employment in isolation. Rather, most empirical work
addressing good faith in employment stems from studies on the
impact of all three wrongful discharge exceptions on wages, em-
ployment and other economic variables. Theories predicting the
effect of discharge protections may be ambiguous. For example,
wages may decrease as bureaucratic and legal costs imposed
upon an employer by discharge protections are passed on to em-
ployees. On the other hand, employee wages might increase
due to an employee's increased bargaining power arising from
potential threats of litigation if discharged. Firm productivity
89. Id.
90. E.g., Ken Matheny & Marion Crain, Disloyal Workers and the "Un-Ameri-
can" Labor Law, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1705, 1746 (2004); Mary LaFrance, Nevada's Em-
ployee Inventions Statute: Novel, Nonobvious, and Patently Wrong, 3 NEV. L.J. 88,
111 (2002). See also Alexander J.S. Colvin, Institutional Pressures, Human Re-
source Strategies, and the Rise of Nonunion Dispute Resolution Procedures, 56 IN-
DUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 375, 379 (2003) (reporting interviews with managers who, in
expressing fear of employment litigation, cited California as a state that "posed a
particularly strong threat").
91. 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980).
92. Foley v. Interactive Data Corp., 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988).
93. Cf Lauren B. Edelman, Steven E. Abraham & Howard S. Erlanger, Pro-
fessional Construction of Law: The Inflated Threat of Wrongful Discharge, 26 LAw
& Soc'y REV. 47 (1992) (studying influence of professional and legal professions on
managerial decision making through surveying characterizations of the implied




might decline as managers become more reluctant to dismiss
unproductive workers because of the legal risks. Consequently,
dismissal protections may cause firms to hire fewer employees
and thus select more productive employees. There may even
have been a capital deepening effect whereby firms invest more
in capital rather than human resources, thereby shifting away
from the optimal allocation based upon imposed costs. This the-
oretical uncertainty makes empirical studies on the issue all the
more important.
Thomas J. Miles, for example, found that the adoption of
the good faith exception in a given state correlated with signifi-
cant increases in the temporary help industry in that state.94
This finding dovetails well with David Autor's findings that
adoption of wrongful discharge exceptions explained twenty
percent of the growth of the temporary help services industry in
the United States.95 Autor, however, emphasizes the impact of
this growth to the implied contract exception of employment at
will rather than the good faith covenant.96
Max Schanzenbach examined the impact of wrongful dis-
charge exceptions on job tenure and wages.97 Schanzenbach
used the Current Population Survey (CPS)98 and Panel Study of
Income Dynamics (PSID),99 the only two nationwide datasets
available that possess information about tenure and wages for
the relevant years. Schanzenbach found no consistent effect of
the good faith exception upon job tenure and limited but not
94. Thomas J. Miles, Common Law Exceptions to Employment at Will and
U.S. Labor Markets, 16 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 74 (2000). See generally George Gonos,
The Contest over "Employer" Status in the Postwar United States: The Case of Tem-
porary Help Firms, 31 LAw & Soc'y REV. 81 (1997).
95. David H. Autor, Outsourcing at Will: The Contribution of Unjust Dismis-
sal Doctrine to the Growth of Employment Outsourcing, 21 J. LAB. ECON. 1 (2003).
96. See id. at 4 n.2.
97. Max Schanzenbach, Exceptions to Employment at Will: Raising Firings
Costs or Enforcing Life-Cycle Contracts?, 5 Am. L. & ECON. REV. 470 (2003).
98. The Current Population Survey is "a monthly survey of about 50,000
households conducted by the Bureau of the Census for the Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics ... [which provides estimates on] employment, unemployment, earnings,
hours of work, and other indicators." Current Population Survey, http://www.cen-
sus.gov/cps/ (last visited Sep. 20, 2007).
99. The Panel Study of Income Dynamics is a longitudinal study of 8,000 U.S.
families gathering data on economic, health and social behavior since 1968. Panel
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completely robust effects on wages. 00 These conclusions are
presented tentatively, however, due to the limited number of
states that have adopted the good faith exception, which in turn
limits the number of testable observations.' 0 ' These findings
dovetail those obtained by Autor, Donohue and Schwab, who
found no strong evidence of employment or wage effects based
upon the good faith exception. 0 2
In 2004, Adriana Kugler and Gilles Saint-Paul examined
whether increases in firing costs arising from wrongful dis-
charge laws may cause employers to prefer hiring employed
workers who are less likely to be unproductive. 0 3 The authors
found that wrongful discharge protections did in fact reduce the
employment probabilities of the unemployed relative to the em-
ployed. 0 4 These observations were found most robustly from
the adoption of the good faith exception. 0 5 Kugler and Saint-
Paul report that the good faith exception triggered a 23 percent
reduction in the probability of the unemployed finding work, ac-
counting for the majority of the effect in unemployment-to-em-
ployment flows in the study. 0 6
Efforts to study the impact of good faith have now ex-
panded into specific costs imposed upon firms as compared to
broader economic variables. A study of the impact of wrongful
discharge exceptions on firm productivity revealed that the
adoption of the good faith exception in a given state reduced
annual employment fluctuations and the entry of new establish-
ments. 10 7 The results suggest that the exception caused em-
ployers to retain unproductive workers thus reducing overall
efficiency. 108
Steven Abraham studied the influence of watershed Cali-
fornia and New York employment cases on shareholder re-
100. Schanzenbach, supra note 97, at 500-01.
101. Id. at 501.
102. Autor, Donohue & Schwab, supra note 32.
103. Adriana D. Kugler & Gilles Saint-Paul, How do Firing Costs Affect
Worker Flows in a World with Adverse Selection?, 22 J. LAB. ECON. 553 (2004).
104. Id. at 578.
105. Id. at 575.
106. Id.
107. David H. Autor, William R. Kerr & Adriana D. Kugler, Does Employment
Protection Reduce Productivity?: Evidence from US States, 117 EcoN. J. F189
(2007).




turns. 10 9 One of the decisions studied was the now familiar
Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc.1" 0 Abraham found that over
the three-day window surrounding the date of the ruling, share-
holder returns decreased by 1.52 percent in response to
Cleary."' When the California Supreme Court decided Foley v.
Interactive Data Corp. ,112 an opinion that significantly curtailed
the broad reach of the good faith doctrine as articulated in
Cleary, shareholder returns increased 1.3 percent during the
three days surrounding the decision. 1 3
Recently, another paper (of which this author is a co-writer)
explores the impact of wrongful discharge laws, including the
good faith exception, upon firm efficiency."14 The challenge of
studying the effect of state good faith law on firms is that many
have operations that cross state lines. As a result, it becomes
difficult to isolate the impact of a particular state's legal rules
on a multi-state or national enterprise. Abraham addressed
this problem by using Compustat, a commercial research
database, which uses a variable called "State" that identifies
the primary location of each firm's operations. 15 We addressed
this problem by studying a single industry, commercial banks,
in detail. Until the early 1990s, Congress restricted state
chartered banks to interstate operations, thus controlling for
the multi-state problem inherent in studying private firms."16
The majority of state adoption of wrongful discharge exceptions,
including good faith, also occurred before the early 1990s.117
After testing for the presence of increased numbers of full
time employees, increased salaries, increased capital expendi-
tures and decreased return on assets, we did not find a statisti-
109. Steven E. Abraham, An Empirical Assessment of Employment at Will: A
Tale of Two States, 46 MANAGERIAL LAw 3 (2004).
110. 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980).
111. Abraham, supra note 109, at 11.
112. 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988).
113. Abraham, supra note 109, at 13.
114. Robert C. Bird & John Knopf, Do Wrongful Discharge Laws Impair Firm
Performance? (unpublished manuscript on file with the authors).
115. Abraham, supra note 109, at 9. Abraham also notes that given the time
lag between the relevant events and the date of study, the firm's primary location
was coded manually. Id. at 9 n.32.
116. See generally Jerry W. Markham, Banking Regulation: Its History and
Future, 4 N.C. BANKING INST. 221 (2000).
117. Knopf & Bird, supra note 114, at Exhibit 1.
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cally significant and robust correlation between these measures
and good faith. 118 The good faith exception did appear to posi-
tively relate to firm labor expenses, the implication being that
increased difficulty in discharging workers caused by this re-
quirement increased legal and human resource expenditures. 1 9
These results, however, were not significant at conventional
levels. We also found a significant relationship between the
adoption of the good faith exception and an increase in full time
employees. 20 This may imply an increased retention in unpro-
ductive employees due to the threat of legal disputes and their
associated costs arising from the exception. This relationship,
however, could not be sustained under our robustness checks.
Like other empirical studies of wrongful discharge, the implied
contract exception and not its good faith counterpart appeared
to have the greatest impact on our measures.' 2'
Conclusion
Ninety years after Cardozo's landmark decision, we still
know little about the appropriate role of good faith in employ-
ment. After riding the initial wave of wrongful discharge adop-
tions, good faith has settled into a secondary role. Few states
have adopted the covenant and those that have are limiting its
application to contractual "benefit of the bargain" cases. The
result is that the good faith covenant remains absent from most
employment relationships.
Is this necessarily a bad thing? There is some empirical ev-
idence that a good faith covenant may impose costs, but these
costs are limited and not uniformly found. This implies that the
covenant may not impose large costs on employers if applied.
On the other hand, the limited effects may be because good faith
in employment is interpreted so narrowly where it exists at all.
The impact of a robust good faith obligation similar to that ar-
ticulated in Monge and Cleary remains unexplored.
Over the past ninety years, almost 1,200 cases, commenta-
tors and litigants have cited Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon
118. Id. at 25-29.
119. Id. at tbl. 4.
120. Id. at tbl. 3.
121. Id. at 25-29.
20081
19
428 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:409
for one reason or another. According to Westlaw, only a tiny
fraction of these citations constituted "negative citing refer-
ences." The strong imprint that Lucy has placed on the develop-
ment of American law remains unchallenged. The benefit of
that imprint over the past ninety-years, however, especially in
the employment context, remains open to debate for the next
ninety years.
20http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol28/iss2/13
